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1. Introduction  
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and later Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-
BBEE) are policies that impose certain conditions on businesses in South Africa in order for them to 
promote black empowerment, where ‘black’ here can variously mean people who were 
disadvantaged during the Apartheid years. BEE was introduced as a means to ameliorate the 
economic injustice and enforced inequalities of the past that were official government policy in South 
Africa before 1994. ‘Apartheid’ not only meant a separation of racial groups by location but also 
economically. People of colour were systematically excluded from the economy leading to the 
impoverishment of the majority of the population. Successive rounds of the National Income 
Dynamics Survey (NIDS) show that since 1994 there has been very little redistribution of income and 
wealth, and according to estimates, the number of black South Africans who remain in poverty is 
extremely high, at around 23 million, over 56 per cent of the population (StatsSA, 2014). The BEE 
and later B-BBEE policy was designed as a corrective policy that would redistribute income by 
encouraging firms to employ historically disadvantaged people, change their supply chains to buy 
more from black-owned firms, and transfer part of the ownership of firms to black people in some 
cases. Certification was rolled out across the country but there remain few studies that have 
systematically reviewed or evaluated the policy, while a higher number lambast BEE for its assumed 
associations with corrupt behavior.  
Because of the lack of empirical data, this study was able to take advantage of the Durban Firms 
survey to assess the effect of BEE on the firms’ structures over time. The challenge to this exercise 
is that when the original survey was designed it did not include this objective, so the data available 
relies on a small number of indirect variables on ownership, and on qualitative responses given in 
the first and second waves. Also, as with any policy analysis, it is difficult to determine whether it was 
the policy that is causing various changes, or whether these would have happened anyway, or in 
spite of the policy, or whether there are other missing variables that have not been taken into account. 
At most, we can only assert that the policy has contributed to certain changes, rather than a stronger 
result that we can attribute these changes to the policy.  
2. Context and background  
At the onset of democracy in 1994 and the birth of the new South Africa it became apparent that the 
new government needed to implement a policy aimed at redressing the situation of chronic inequality 
and poverty in the country. The response came in the form of the Reconstruction and Development 
Plan (RDP) and part and parcel with this was Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). However, the 
full implications of the RDP and the type of BEE envisioned by it were soon undermined by the shift 
to a new policy, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, which took a more 
neoliberal market oriented approach to development, and this in turn influenced how BEE would be 
seen to operate in the long run (Ponte, Roberts, & Van Sittert, 2007). The aim of BEE was to empower 
previously disadvantaged individuals by allowing them entry into the market place though ownership 
(Ponte et al., 2007). The immediate problem faced by previously disadvantaged individuals entering 
the market place was that in order to become owners of companies they needed capital, which by 
definition they did not have. The solution to this problem, largely driven by a group of South Africa’s 
leading businesses, was to come up with various ‘BEE transactions’ and Special Purpose Vehicles 
to allow blacks to become shareholders of businesses without capital (Chabane, Goldstein, & 
Roberts, 2004; Gqubule, 2006). The resulting deals were often criticised for being vulnerable to lower 
stock performance and for being overvalued, in other words bad deals (Ponte et al., 2007). However, 
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one outcome of this policy has been to create a ‘black capitalist class’ which has been used as an 
example of how empowerment is working, and as an outcome that gives legitimacy to the BEE 
process (Southall, 2007). However, the policy perhaps relies too much on ideas about empowerment 
trickling down from the new elite class and uplifting the classes below (Ponte et al., 2007). 
In fact, the claim that gradual empowerment is occurring has been subject to severe criticism with 
people seeing it as a tool for preserving the status quo in economic systems and policies. Another 
concern about BEE was the too narrow conception of who should be the target of empowerment 
programs. Related criticism has pointed out that the close ties between the black capitalist class and 
the ANC government provide an ideal environment for corruption to flourish (Malikane & Ndletyana, 
2006), and the state capture debate of 2017 has given many illustrations of how BEE vehicles have 
been used by state owned enterprises to liquidate private firms for the benefit of persons connected 
to the political elite. Much of the criticism of BEE has been of this form, that it simultaneously causes 
corruption while lacking the means to address the real structural inequalities present in South Africa. 
These associations between BEE, corruption, cronyism and state capture are most unfortunate in 
relation to the avowed policy objective of economic restitution and redistributive justice, the 
foundational objective of BEE policy. Historically disadvantaged persons still require jobs and a 
chance for inclusive growth.  
These concerns and others, alongside the ubiquitous and obvious need for such a policy, led to an 
expansion and refinement of BEE to a broader based scheme that would address a greater variety 
of issues rather than just ownership. Thus in 2007 legislation was enacted to implement Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) covering a wider range of pathways towards 
empowerment. B-BBEE focuses not just on ownership but also management, skills development, 
enterprise and supplier development, and socioeconomic development, with these forming the 
categories by which successful implementations of B-BBEE are judged. Along with the new 
categories of BBBEE, legislation was passed that entailed the creation of accreditation agencies 
whose job it is to rate businesses in accordance with the B-BBEE principles (Ponte et al., 2007). 
Businesses are rated according to levels from level 8 to level 1, with 8 being the worst level and 1 
being the best level. Businesses with low BEE levels gain greater access to government contracts 
and profit from other benefits.  
However, criticism of the policy has accompanied this phase of the roll out as well. Critics have found 
much to criticize about the implementation of BEE and B-BBEE. Often they compare it unfavourably 
to more effective empowerment programs such as the economic advancement of Afrikaners during 
the period in South Africa of Afrikaner Nationalism with its more effective use of parastatals, and to 
the ‘Malaysian Model’ which both had a greater degree of state involvement and it had poverty 
reduction as a stated goal (Ponte et al., 2007). In addition to the creation of a black capitalist class 
there has also been an emergence of a black middle class but the benefits have not been felt by the 
working class, despite them being the ones most in need of empowerment and development. The 
outsourcing of accreditation to accreditation agencies has been criticised as changing the goals of 
BEE causing them to take a back seat to managerialism and the focus on the technical details around 
how to score and implement accreditation services to the detriment of less easily measured 
outcomes that are the actual stated goals of BEE (Ponte et al., 2007). This ultimately leads to a shift 
in goals away from the empowerment of previously disadvantaged individuals to a more abstract 
process of making sure that businesses obtain low BEE levels. Blame for the ineffectiveness in the 
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implementation of BEE becomes a technical issue and shifts responsibility away from the 
government and to accreditation agencies1. 
The business studies literature also reports negative perceptions of BEE among business managers 
in South Africa (Kruger, 2014), implementation difficulties (Hiam et al., 2017) and little or no 
productivity gains from firm practices or disclosures (Mebratie & Bedi, 2017; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013). However, a recent study by Mehta and Ward (2016) of all Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
listed companies that were BEE compliant between January 2009 and September 2015 shows an 
abnormal return pattern in the short-term associated with a change in BEE score, while in the long 
term, companies with the best BEE scores generated lower returns than those with worse scores. 
The authors attribute this to the high costs of BEE compliance, and say that their analysis adds to 
the body of literature questioning the efficacy of BEE (see also Chopra, 2017). Thus, the debate 
surrounding BEE points to issues of efficacy at the policy level, while the policy itself generates a 
much wider and politicised debate on economic empowerment and economic justice, or the lack of 
it. It is within this context that this study can make a contribution. 
3. Description of the eThekwini Large and Medium Firm Survey 
The eThekwini Medium to Large Manufacturing Firm Survey was largely based on a previous survey 
the Durban Large Firm Survey done by the World Bank in 2003 (World Bank, 2003) see below for 
link) on manufacturing firms around the eThekwini area. The aim of the 2013 eThekwini Large and 
Medium Manufacturing survey (UKZN, 2013) was to gain an updated picture of the manufacturing in 
and around eThekwini and to gain insight into the changes that have taken place in the 10 years 
between the two surveys. An extensive list of manufacturing firms within the eThekwini area was 
created, including the firms from the previous 2003 survey. From this list a total of 132 firms 
responded and agreed to take part in the survey. The survey consisted of 3 modules: module 1 to 
be filled out by the CEO or managing director, module 2 the finance manager, and module three the 
HR manger. These responses were then entered into a database and then went through an extensive 
cleaning process.  
Demographics of Sample 
The total sample size for the survey was n=132 firms. This compared unfavourably to the previous 
World Bank survey which obtained a sample of n=225 though the project has established a reduction 
in the number of relevant firms in the population of large and medium manufacturing establishments 
in eThekwini. Nevertheless, the relatively small number of firms for which data have been captured 
is due to firms refusing to take part in the survey. This is besides firms having gone out of business 
in the interim period between surveys, and changes in firms that made them ineligible to take part in 
the survey (e.g. moved away from manufacturing, moved away from the study area). In order to 
make it comparable to the previous survey a threshold of 50 full time employees (FTES) needed to 
																																																								
1 These technical issues can be reviewed at http://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp. Summary of 




be met reducing the eligible number of firms to n=106. Below is a list of the sample size of firms by 
each sector along with the weighted sample size focusing on those firms. 
Table 1: Description of firm sample, 2003 & 2013 
  Sample Size 2003 Weighted Sample Size 2003 
Chemical products 22 120.6 
Electrical and electronic machinery 13 31 
Food processing and beverages 18 67.69 
Iron and steel 5 7.99 
Leather and footwear 9 26 
Metal products 14 49 
Non-metallic mineral products 17 22.92 
Paper and furniture 32 83.47 
Textiles 36 154 
Vehicles and automotive components 15 37.67 
   
  Sample Size 2013 Weighted Sample Size 2013 
Chemical products 21 96.6 
Electrical and electronic machinery 32 97 
Food processing and beverages 5 14 
Iron and steel 9 55 
Leather and footwear 6 19 
Metal products 2 17 
Non-metallic mineral products 3 24 
Paper and furniture 4 28 
Textiles 17 63 










Figure 1: Distribution of number of employees 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the number of employees in the Large and medium Manufacturing 
Firm survey showing that the majority of firms have somewhere between 50 and 300 employees with 
a mean of around 229. Figure 2 shows the numbers of firms by size measured by the number of full-
time employees. 
 




Figure 2 shows that the majority of the firms surveyed have 50-99 employees, with these making up 
38% of the sample. However, firms with 200+ FTEs also made up 33%, a large proportion of the 
sample. Table 2 begins to show how the proportion of previously disadvantaged individuals (PDI) 
ownership has changed between the first survey in 203 and the second in 2013. It shows a shift from 
62% of firms who had no PDI ownership in 2013, to a drop to 46% who still had no PDI ownership in 
2013. Those firms at the top of the scale, in the bracket 95–100 % of ownership, however, showed 
a very similar 25% of PDI ownership in 2003, only moving fractionally to around 26% in 2013. 
 
Table 2: PDI ownership comparison between 2003 and 2013 
Percentage PDI 
Ownership 2003 2013 
0% 62.36 46.15 
1 % to 5% 0.86 1.54 
5% to 10% 0.77 2.92 
10% to 15% 0.00 2.31 
15% to 20% 0.58 0.00 
20% to 25% 1.76 2.09 
25% to 30% 2.54 7.78 
30% to 35% 1.94 0.86 
35% to 40% 0.00 1.47 
40% to 45% 0.89 0.76 
45% to 50% 0.00 0.80 
50% to 55% 1.27 1.69 
55% to 60% 0.00 0.00 
60% to 65% 0.00 0.80 
65% to 70% 0.00 0.00 
70% to 75% 0.25 0.00 
75% to 80% 0.70 0.00 
80% to 85% 0.00 2.31 
85% to 90% 0.70 0.76 
90% to 95% 0.00 0.00 
95% to 100% 25.43 25.56 






4. BEE Levels of Firms 
The majority of manufacturing firms have BEE levels of 3 to 5. Around 25% percent of manufacturing 
firms in eThekwini have a BEE level of 4. 18% of firms have a BEE level of 3 and 13% have a BEE 
level of 5. 
 







Figure 4: Size of the firm and its relation to BEE 
 
A BEE level of 1 or 2, the better levels, were associated with smaller businesses with 50-99 FTEs. 
BEE Levels of 3 and 4 were associated with businesses with 200+ FTEs and 100-199 FTEs 
respectively. BEE levels 6 and 7 were associated with fewer firms with 100-199 FTEs.  
Figure 5: Size of the firm and its relation to PDI 
 
Firms that have 50-99 FTEs are more likely to have 0% PDI ownership. Firms with greater numbers 
of employees were associated with higher PDI ownership. For example, firms with 100-199 FTEs 
were more likely to have 25% to 50% PDI ownership. This perhaps reflects the legacy of white family 
owned firms who are wholly private and do little work for government. These have less motivation to 
seek higher BEE compliance levels. 
In terms of how the industrial sector affects BEE levels and PDI ownership, we see that clothing and 
textiles and non-metal minerals have the higher levels of BEE, with food processing, leather and 




Figure 6: Sectorial Differences in BEE 
 




In terms of the effect of industrial sector on PDI ownership, the survey shows that in some 
industries there are no previously disadvantaged persons with any share holdings, notably in metal 
products. Clothing and textiles and paper and furniture have the highest PDI ownership levels. 
The effect of parent companies on PDI ownership and BEE 
In this section we will examine the effect of having a parent company on PDI ownership and BEE 
levels, and whether the location of the parent company makes a difference. 
 
Figure 8: Percentage of firms with parent companies and their locations 
	
Over half, at 53.5%, of firms in the survey had parent companies with 9.7% of them being outside of 





Figure 9: PDI ownership by parent company 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
86.13 3 1.486e-18 * * * 
There is a significant association between parent company location and PDI ownership levels (𝜒" = 
86.129, p = 1.486×10*+, ). The most striking result shown in figure 9 is that having a parent 
company outside of SA is highly associated with not having any PDIs in the ownership structure of 
the local business. This suggests that FDI and foreign parents are not a good driver of BEE. This 
situation compares to a much greater likelihood of PDI ownership in firms with a parent company in 
South Africa, which is associated with being partially or fully PDI owned. Also, having no parent 




Figure 10: BEE level by parent company location 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
30.05 6 3.849e-05 * * * 
Not surprisingly this is also seen when we look at BEE levels broken down by location of parent 
company, this too is significantly associated (𝜒" = 30.05, p = 3.849×10*/). Higher BEE levels (4-
6) are associated with businesses that have parent companies outside SA and lower BEE levels (1-
3) are associated with businesses with parent companies within SA. This shows that national firms 
are investing in better BEE compliance than foreign firms, who may have less interest or see ffewer 
benefits of the domestic legislation. Having no parent company is associated with BEE Levels of 7-
8, where these are also likely to be the smaller companies in the sample. 
There is also good news when the changes in PDI managers between 2003 and 2013 are 
explored, as shown in table 3. This shows that in 2003, only a third of firms had PDI managers, 
which had risen to just over half in 2013. The highest number of PDI managers were in positions of 
managing production processes at 79%, while overall board membership had also risen from a low 








Table 3: PDIs in management positions within the firms, 2003 & 2013 
 2003 (n=496) 2013 (n=406) 
General Manager 33% 51% 
Production 50% 79% 
Human Resources 39% 54% 
Finance 41% 61% 
Marketing 36% 35% 
On the board 30% 37% 
*Percentage of firms that have PDIs in managerial positions 
 
5. Firm performance and BEE 
 
In terms of firm performance and its association with BEE the following figure 12 reports on self-
reported performance levels.  
 
Figure 11: Self-reported financial performance and BEE level 
 
 
Figure 12 shows self-reported financial performance over the years by BEE Level. Firms were asked 
to report whether they had 'made a profit', "made a loss" or 'broke even' for the years 2008-2012. 
The percentage of firms reporting profits, losses or breaking even is plotted. Having a BEE level of 
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1-3 was slightly less profitable particularly when comparing outcomes in the year 2012. However, 




Figure 12: Outsourcing and the size of the firm 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
22.72 2 1.165e-05 * * * 
 
Outsourcing was significantly associated with the size of the firm. Firms with 50-99 FTEs are less 





Figure 13: Outsourcing by BEE Level 
	
Test statistic df P value 
12.19 2 0.002255 * * 
Outsourcing was significantly associated with BEE level, firms with BEE levels of 7-8 were less likely 
to outsource  
7. Perceptions of BEE 
The survey asked whether BEE had had an effect on the firm and the results are shown in Figure 




Figure 14: Perceptions of BEE 
 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
34 4 7.466e-07 * * * 
Firms reporting being affected due to BEE were associated with their percentage PDI ownership (𝜒" 
= 34, p = 7.466e-07). Firms that reported being most affected by BEE were likely to be 0% PDI 
owned. At the opposite end of the PDI ownership scale, firms with 75% to 100% levels of PDI 
ownership were associated with being less affected by BEE. The survey also asked whether BEE 
had imposed a cost on the business, and the results here are shown in Figure 16 in relation to BEE 





Figure 15: BEE and costs to businesses by BEE level 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
31.43 2 1.498e-07 * * * 





Figure 16: BEE and costs to businesses by PDI ownership 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
41.14 4 2.51e-08 * * * 
Percentage PDI ownership is also significantly associated with firms reporting that BEE has imposed 
a cost on them (χ^2 = 41.14, p = 2.51e-08). Firms with 0% of PDI ownership were more likely to 
report that BEE imposed a cost upon them but PDI ownership levels between 25% and 75% were 
less likely to report a cost. High PDI ownership levels (75% - 100%) showed no significant association 
in reporting of cost or no cost. Qualitative responses on how BEE has imposed a cost on the firm are 
illustrated below: Many firms reported that the audit costs for obtaining and maintaining BEE status 
were high. “Audit costs associated with maintaining status and need to comply” and, “maintaining 
scorecard is difficult”, and “Audit/consultant cost and training costs”. Another theme that appeared 
was that the cost of training that BEE imposes is high, “Skills development [for BBBEE] costs money”, 
“Cost and training cos.”, and “Increased social & training expenditure to get to current BBBEE level” 
appeared as responses. These reflect the fact that businesses are having to change in reaction to 
BEE and BBBEE and provide skills to PDI employees.  
A further question asked was whether BEE had required the firm to restructure, and the results are 
shown in Figure 18 by BEE level and Figure 19 by PDI ownership. 
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Figure 17: BEE and restructuring by BEE level 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
31.43 2 1.498e-07 * * * 
Firms reporting the need to restructure due to BEE were associated with their current BEE level (χ^2 
= 31.427, p = 1.498×〖10〗^(-7)). Firms who reported the need to restructure were more likely to 
be in BEE levels 4-6 and firms that reported they did not need to restructure were more likely to be 




Figure 18: BEE and restructuring by PDI ownership level 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
41.14 4 2.51e-08 * * * 
Firms that reported that they needed to restructure due to BEE requirements were also significantly 
associated with percentage PDI ownership of the firm (χ^2 = 41.14 , p = 2.51e-08). Firms with PDI 
ownership of less than 25% were more likely to report a need to restructure due to BEE, however 
firms from 25% to 75% reported less need to restructure. Qualitative responses to how the firms 
have had to restructure are illustrated below Firms reported that they had to restructure their 
employment structure, for example one firm reported “High turnover of qualified skilled mid-level 
managers” others reported “People reshuffling” and “Changes to management structure,” and 
another firm reported, “Just increased the number of PDIs in the est”. These indicate that a big part 
of the restructuring within firms has to do with PDI employees and the erratic nature of their 
employment. Another firms reported, “Sold a stake of the company to a trust (workers),” this reflects 
the push to increase the amount of PDI ownership.  
When asked whether BEE had benefitted the firm the results appear to be weakly in favour of yes 




Figure 19: Benefits of BEE by BEE level 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
6.536 2 0.03808 * 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab Whether the firm reported that they had benefited from BEE was 
slightly associated with BEE level (χ^2 = 6.536, p = 0.038). Firms we a BEE level of 1-3 were slightly 




Figure 20: Benefits of BEE by PDI ownership 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
34.85 4 4.984e-07 * * * 
Whether a firm reported benefiting from BEE was significantly associated with the percentage of the 
firm that was PDI owned (χ^2 = 34.85, p = 4.984e-07). Firms with 0% PDI ownership were less likely 
to report benefiting from BEE. These firms, perhaps unsurprisingly since they often cited high costs, 
were likely to see BEEE as unhelpful to them. Firms that had high levels of PDI ownership (75% - 
100%) were more likely to report benefiting from BEE. Qualitative responses show that firms 
benefitted from BEE in these ways: It opened up opportunities for new contracts and other business 
opportunities, “Being able to contract with corporate [firms]”, “New contracts/government orders can 
be secured or have been secured,” and “Enables BEE companies to be more competitive.” Another 
benefit reported was in terms of credibility gained from being BEE compliant, “Has assisted in gaining 
credibility with customers,” and “Customers do not worry about rating,” and “Customers require 
acceptable BEE status.” This shows that one of the motivations for firms obtaining BEE accreditation 




8. Unionisation and BEE 
 
Figure 21: Labour regulations and BEE 
 
Having no unionisation is mostly associated with firms with BEE levels of 1-3. Very high levels of 
unionization are associated with fewer firms with BEE levels of 1-3, but with those having less 










Figure 23: Unionisation and PDI Ownership 
 
Having no unionisation was also associated with high levels of PDI ownership (75% to 100%) The 
greatest levels of unionisation were seen at the 25 to 50% PDI ownership level. The 0% PDI 




Figure 24: BEE and Strikes 
 
 
BEE levels of 1-3 were associated with not having a strike in 2012. BEE Levels 4-6 and 7-8 are 




Figure 25: Strikes and Firm Size 
 




Figure 26: PDI Ownership Levels and Strikes 
 
Pearson's Chi-squared test: tab 
Test statistic df P value 
22.31 4 0.000174 * * * 
PDI Ownership levels of 75% to 100% were associated with higher levels of strikes in 2012. 
In fact 8 of the 22 strikes reported in 2012 were at firms with 100% PDI ownership. 
 
9. Conclusion 
We have looked at all the variables in the Durban Firms Survey in both 2003 and 2013 that relate to 
BEE policy and its implementation. Perhaps of most interest is the finding that national firms, in 
comparison to foreign parents, are more likely to have higher levels of compliance. Those firms with 
PDI ownership and better BEE levels are also likely to view BEE policy in a more favourable light 
than those with low PDI levels who appear to see only its negative costs. Larger firms are also likely 
to see BEE in a better light. In relation to the overall debate about the consequences of BEE to 
growth and competitiveness, the good news from this survey is that PDI ownership is improving, 
although it is still slow and only 37% of PDI were appearing at board level, while the relationship 
between BEE and overall firm profitability is mixed, but low performers on BEE were more likely to 
self-report losses in 2012.  
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While this report can only make a small contribution to the wider literature, it seems accurate to note 
that many of these associations are quite weakly proved, which also indicates that whatever effects 
BEE is having they are pretty marginal and certainly not the worst case scenarios offered by 
detractors of BEE. There is a case to be made that economic transformation will need a 
strengthening of deliberative policy in favour of equity if further improvements to economic justice 
are to be made. The data here shows that if PDI have ownership and management positions the 
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